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Notting really matters much,
it's doom alone that counts.
Bob Dylan, "Shelter from the Storm"
1 Introduction
Economic activity is a superstructure on a fragile ecological system. The two systems affect, and are
affected by each other. To many, a pressing question is whether the economy can -- or should -- grow
in the long run in the face of ecological constraints. "Can" refers to whether the economy-ecology
integrated system eventually evolves to the point where economic growth is impossible. "Should"
refers to whether continued economic growth is desirable when one accounts for various
environmental externalities that increase with production.
This paper addresses these issues. We assess empirically the size of the environmental drag on
economic development. The environmental drag is the cost of ecological constraints on economic
development, for instance the non-availability of infinite amounts of cheap resources or pollution. The
environmental drag is large if ecological constraints radically slow down economic growth, or the
welfare costs of ecological constraints are large. The concept measures to what extent the economy
can or should grow over time. Economists have made valuable theoretical contributions to the study
of the environmental drag. For instance, Dasgupta ind Heal (1974) show that a steady state growth
path only exists if non-renewable resources are unessential in production. Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen
(1993) show that a steady state path of an economy with pollution only exists if the discount rate is
"small", that is smaller than the marginal productivity of capital as the capital stock goes to zero, and
smaller than the growth rate of the renewable resource as the resource stock goes to zero. This must be
the case for all levels of emissions (including very small ones) and all levels of stock pollution
(including very large ones). For a more policy oriented discussion of the same issues, see Nordhaus
(1992).
To estimate the environmental drag we employ a complete dynamic general equilibrium (CGE)
model DREAM (dynamic resource/environment applied model). The dynamic CGE model is
generally recognised as a powerful tool for conducting medium to long-mn applied economic analysis
of energy and the environment (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Wikoxen (1993)). Our model is in our view
particularly well suited to analyse the environmental drag because it treats the economy and the
ecology as a simultaneous, extended dynamic general equilibrium system. There are linkages, in the
form of environmental externalities, back and forth between the economy and the environment.
Predecessors in this field include the "DICE" model of Nordhaus (1993) and the model of Kverndokk
(1993). These global models focus on the interdependence between economic activity and CO2-
emissions. A study by Glomsrod, Vennemo and Johnsen (1992) includes most of the environmental
linkages of the present paper, but they are modelled as unidirectional effects. Brendemoen and
Vennemo (1994) take that methodology further. See also fikonson and Mathiesen (1995). There is a
large literature that describes emissions to air associated with economic activity. Jorgenson and
Wilcoxen (1993) survey that literature.
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We compare two simulations on our extended dynamic applied general equilibrium model. In one
simulation, we assume that there are no linkages between the environment and the economy. Call this
the traditional scenario on the traditional economic model. In the other simulation, we introduce the
mutual dependence between the economy and the ecosystem as an additional constraint on economic
development. Call this the feedback scenario on the feedback model. The outcome of our comparison
is an estimate of the environmental drag.
Nordhaus (1992) presents some estimates of global environmental drags in a related contribution.
The main drag is the non-availability of cheap energy resources, which according to the paper reduces
long-term growth by 0.15 percentage points per year. Local pollutants reduce growth by 0.04
percentage points, while greenhouse warming reduces growth by 0.03 percentage points. In a study of
the US, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) fmd that environmental regulation reduced annual economic
growth by 0.2 percentage points over the period 1974-1985. The long run reduction in growth is
significantly lower. Assuming a rational political process one can interpret this as an estimate of the
willingness to pay for avoiding environmental drags.
We study the environmental drag of a particular country, Norway. Norway is neither a big
economic power nor particularly important in the global ecology. It may therefore represent the vast
majority of countries that are ordinary members of the world community. The environmental impacts
covered by the study are effects on health, materials and nature by air pollution. In addition, we
account for costs related to road traffic, like noise, road damage, congestion and accidents.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our model, with a special emphasis on
environmental linkages. We believe that results to come out of a CGE model (or any other model) are
no better than the model allows. Therefore we describe the model in some detail. Section 3 presents
the main set of results. Section 4 explores the sensitivity of these results to central parameters of the
model. Section 5 indicates effects of introducing some channels of interdependence of a more
exploratory nature. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Below is a verbal description of the model. A complete technical documentation can be found in
Vennemo (1994).
2.1 Overview
Our model is a growth model of Cass-Koopmans type. The economy of Norway is reasonably stylised
as a small, open economy. A small open economy faces an exogenous interest rate and prices on
competitive products. An infinitely lived consumer with perfect foresight maximises utility from
goods and leisure. There are nine industries. Six of them have competitive producers with perfect
foresight. One of these produce tradables. This (large) industry determines the wage, which in
combination with the exogenous interest rate and self fulfilling expectations of the future user cost of
capital, determines the output prices of non-tradables.
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Figure 1. The dynamics of the feedback model
Environmental
quality
Material
consumption
Trade balances intertemporally. The annual trade balance reflects intertemporal optimisation by
consumers and producers, and changes with underlying economic conditions. This treatment is similar
to current work in trade theory, see Obstfeld (1982) for an early contribution. A lump sum tax clears
the public budget. We impose annual budget balance. This is an innocent assumption because
Ricardian equivalence holds in this model.
The feedback model version tracks emissions to air of seven important pollutants, and road traffic
volumes. The emissions to air and the traffic volumes form the impacts from the economy to the
environment.
We identify three links from the environment to the economy, see figure 1. There is a link between
the environment and consumer welfare. Another concerns labour productivity. The third link goes
from environmental quality to the rate of capital depreciation. The basis for these is the models of
environmental effects of macroeconomic policy developed by Brendemoen, Glomsrod and Aaserud
(1992) and Glomsrod, Nesbakken and Aasenid (1994). They emphasise eleven external effects of
economic activity, namely acidification of lakes, acidification of forests, health damage and
annoyance from exposure to NO„, SO2,
CO and particulate matter, corrosion of
building materials, noise from traffic,
traffic accidents, congestion and road
depreciation.
The feedback model is limited to impacts
of fossil fuel emissions and material
inputs, and of course gives only a rough
indication of environmental effects of
economic activity. Its merit is the general
equilibrium perspective on the link
between the economy and the
environment. Higher fossil fuel
consumption can be expected to increase
emissions to air and road traffic,
creating environmental externalities that
will feed back into the economic model.
2.2 Producer behaviour
Output is produced in multi-level CES production functions. At the top level, material input and a
capital-energy-labour composite combine into gross production. The elasticity of substitution is zero;
material input is a fixed factor. This is a standard assumption in CGE models, and a reasonable
approximation to the data of Norway (compare, e.g. Glomsrod, Vennemo and Johnsen (1992), table
2).
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The capital-energy-labour composite aggregates labour and a capital-energy composite, while
energy aggregates fuel oil and hydro power, all in successive CES-nests. The elasticities of
substitution, which differ among the "endogenous" industries, are derived from Alfsen, Bye and
Hoimøy (1995), and from Mysen (1991).
	Tractables Petroleum Construc- Wholesale	 Housing	 Other
refming	 tion	 and retail	 services
trade
Material input vs.
labour-capital-energy
Labour vs.capital-
energy
Capital vs.energy
Heating fuel vs. electricity
0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
0.72	 0.0	 0.0	 1.08	 0.16	 0.8
0.52	 0.0	 0.02	 0.7	 0.16	 0.67
0.42	 0.0	 0.13	 0.37	 0.0	 0.18
Table 1. Elasticities of substitution in industries
The elasticities of substitution are listed in table 1. Elasticities of substitution are generally below
unity, indicating an inelastic production structure.
Capital demand is determined so that the value of the marginal productivity of capital equals the
user cost of capital. The user cost of capital includes self-fulfilling expectations of future prices.
Labour demand is such that the value of the marginal productivity of labour equals the price of
effective labour input. There is an exogenous trend increase in labour productivity.
Besides the endogenous industries listed in table 1, we model three exogenous industries: the
significant production of crude oil and gas, production of  hydro-power', and a public sector, all
heavily regulated.
2.3 Consumption
The infinitely lived consumer in the model is a simplifying device with some merit via the extended
family argument of Barr (1974). Distributional issues are ignored. We assume preferences to have a
multi-level CES structure. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5, a value broadly
consistent with econometric evidence in Norway (Steffensen (1989),
 Biørn and Jansen (1982), Frisch
(1959)). In the first stage of a three-stage budgeting procedure, the consumer spends total wealth on
full consumption, i.e. consumption of goods and leisure. This aspect of her behaviour can be described
by an Euler-equation that relates the interest rate, the rate of pure time preference, growth in full
consumption and the elasticity of marginal utility in a familiar textbook way.
'Norway presently produces hydro-power to cover domestic demand for electricity.
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The consumer spends full consumption on leisure and consumer goods. Time series evidence in
Norway points to a low wage elasticity of labour force participation (0.0 for men, 0.2 for unmarried
women, Zakariassen (1994)). Cross section studies find a larger, but similar response (0.2 for men, 0.4
for women, Dagsvik and Strom (1992)) and a significantly larger uncompensated wage elasticity of
labour supply: 0.3 for men, 0.9 for women. Further, Dagsvik and Strøm (1992) report a low (4.0)
income effect on labour supply, indicating that uncompensated and compensated elasticities are fairly
close. Based on this information, we assume an uncompensated labour supply elasticity of 0.3 and a
compensated elasticity of 0.4. This gives credit in a time-series model to the time series information
while using the cross-section information as well. We calibrate the time endowment and the elasticity
of substitution between leisure and consumption to obtain the labour supply elasticities. Consumer
expenditure is spread on housing, tourism abroad and a general composite good capturing the rest in a
Cobb-Douglas system.
2.4 Welfare
The welfare function of the feedback model is additive in welfare from full consumption and welfare
from the environment. The arguments in the welfare function are in other words consumption of
goods and services, consumption of leisure and consumption of environmental services. The
traditional model of course excludes welfare from the environment.
The welfare function has the following properties: It rationalises the household behaviour we have
just outlined. It implies in the feedback model that environmental quality does not affect the choices
made by the consumer. It implies that the marginal willingness to trade an environmental good of any
period for full consumption in the same period equals the base year empirical estimate. The
willingness to trade an environmental good of any period for full consumption of a later period equals
the discounted value of the same parameter. We discuss this hypothesis below.
Changes in welfare is measured by equivalent changes in (human plus financial- and real-capital)
wealth, i.e. the welfare change of a price increase is measured by the equivalent change in wealth at
the original set of prices. This is the traditional equivalent variation method in a dynamic context. To
arrive at a unit free measure of welfare change, we divide equivalent variation by (traditional
scenario) wealth.
Between the traditional model and the environmental feedback model there is a difference in
welfare even at constant prices. This difference is measured in monetary terms and can be interpreted
as equivalent to a reduction in wealth, i.e. we treat it too by a equivalent variation method.
2.5 Emissions and traffic
The feedback model tracks emissions to air of seven pollutants. CO and PK () (particulates) cause
local pollution problems. SO2 and
 NO cause local pollution and contribute to the formation of acid
rain, and NMVOC (non-methane volatile organic compounds) generate ground level 03 (ozone),
causing local, regional and global environmental problems. Finally CO2 and to a lesser degree CH.
(methane) are important greenhouse gases.
For each pollutant and industry, emissions from mobile combustion, stationary combustion and
industrial processes are assumed proportional to consumption of gasoline, fuel oil and material inputs
respectively. Emissions from private consumption are proportional to households' gasoline and fuels
consumption. Some emissions (e.g. from firewood) are exogenous. The "emission coefficients" are
calibrated to base year data on emissions by source and industry relative to the relevant emission
carrier. Exogenous abatement reduces the emission coefficients over time according to projections by
the Norwegian Pollution Control Agency.
We use gasoline and auto-diesel consumption to proxy traffic. The argument is that other things
being equal, the change in gasoline and auto-diesel consumption captures the change in traffic
reasonably well.
2.6 The environment
Several authors value environmental goods in Norway, see the survey of Navrud and Strand (1992)
for examples. Many studies concern phenomena that have small ties to the national economy, for
instance because they focus on a small habitat or a limited geographic area. We focus here on problem
areas that can be linked to economic variables at the level of aggregation of the model, and problems
that are likely to be affected by economic policy and have a non-negligible national importance. The
parameters describing the interaction between the economy and the environment are difficult to pin
down, for obvious reasons. Our parameter values serve as illustrations rather than precise estimates.
With that in mind, we now go on to describe the environmental linkages incorporated in this study.
2.6.1 Depreciation
SO2, NO  and some other pollutants induce corrosion on different sorts of capital equipment. From
Brendemoen, Glomsrød and Aaserud (1992) we have data on the relation between 502 and corrosion
costs associited with building and similar capital assets. Air pollution also harms buildings and
monuments of cultural value. This effect, while probably important, is not included in the model for
data reasons.
For public capital, there is a different source of depreciation: road traffic. Traffic wears down the
roads and increases road depreciation. This creates a burden on public expenditures that eventually
crowds out private activity. The weight of vehicles is important for road depreciation: the heavier a
vehicle, the more it wears down the road. With weight characteristics assumed constant over time, the
amount of traffic is a reasonable proxy for the determinants of road depreciation.
2.6.2 Productivity
The environment affects labour productivity in several ways. For instance, reduced air quality
increases respiratory illnesses, asthmatic reactions etc., which lead to more sick leaves and a decline
in labour productivity. From Brendemoen, Glomsrod and Aaserud (1992) we get data for this
relationship. The bottom line is an expert panel appointed by the Norwegian Pollution Control
Agency that estimated the productivity cost of one person being above the WHO threshold level of
pollution from SO2, NOR, CO and particulates, respectively. The panel based their estimates on
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evidence from Lave and Seskin (1977) and others. Dispersion models for emissions to air have been
used to identify the number of people exposed to higher than threshold levels of pollution as
emissions increase. Only urban emissions are assumed to do harm.
A large number of traffic casualties that are unable to work adds up to a decrease in labour
productivity in macro. We model traffic casualties along the lines of Glomsrød, Nesbakken and
Aaserud (1994). Data for gasoline and diesel consumption are combined with assumptions on gasoline
and diesel efficiency to derive estimates of vehicle kilometres. Estimates for vehicle kilometres are
combined with evidence on road capacity investments to derive an estimate of congestion.
We assume the number of traffic casualties (with person injuries) to be proportional to gasoline
(cars) and diesel (trucks, buses) vehicle kilometres, and inversely related to congestion. We estimate
the reduction in the labour force to be a fraction of casualties "this year" that accounts for short term
injuries and injuries to dependants, plus diminishing fractions of casualties over the last 8 years that
account for medium term injuries, plus a constant annual fraction of casualties over the last 37 years
that accounts for permanent injuries and deaths. The average remaining working life for the
permanently injured or dead would have been 37 years.
In a long-run model, we face the question of what happens if emissions affecting the supply of
labour and capital grow without bounds. An upper bound for pollution induced corrosion is assumed
to be 7.5 percent, 3 times the actual base year rate of depreciation. A rate of 2.5 percent implies that
the average building is reduced by one half in around 30 years, while a corrosion induced rate of 7.5
percent implies that the same deterioration occurs in about 9 years. For labour productivity loss,
maximum values are assumed to be 3 percent for
 NO  and particulates, and 1.5 percent for SO2 and
CO. An upper boundary for productivity loss from traffic noise is set to 1 percent. None of the
maxima are binding within the first 101 years of the feedback scenario.
We model the external effects as second order truncated polynomials to ensure a smooth approach
to the maximum values. This implies a decreasing marginal impact which may be too optimistic in
some cases.
2.6.3 Welfare from environmental services
Human welfare obviously depends on the quality of environmental services. We obtain point
estimates of the marginal cost of environmental degradation from Brendemoen, Glomsrod and
Aaserud (1992), who rely on a variety of sources. These are monetary cost estimates that can be
directly compared with monetary gains in consumption or wealth. We assume constant marginal costs
of degradation as an approximation. A more sophisticated approach would include income and price
effects, like for instance having the marginal cost increase with income as it seems reasonable that
environmental services are income elastic (this conjecture is however not born out by some of the few
empirical studies of the matter, see e.g., Karminen and Kriström (1993)), or having the cost increase in
environmental damage. However, the data quality at the moment precludes any sophisticated
modelling. Our cost estimates are uncertain even as marginal cost approximations, but they do
indicate a likely interval.
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As described above, emissions of NO., SO2, CO and particulates are assumed to harm labour
productivity. But an increased risk of illness or even death as a result of air pollution has a welfare
dimension as well. Besides, some of the most vulnerable parts of the population are non-workers, like
children and the elderly. Somewhat arbitrarily we claim the welfare cost of air pollution to be one half
the productivity cost.
Estimates of external costs of road traffic (road damage, noise and congestion) are based on studies
by the Norwegian Pollution Control Agency and concern the capital Oslo. The geographical
allocation of a given increase in traffic volume is important when calculating external costs from
traffic. We assume that 30 percent of traffic cause congestion costs. This number corresponds to the
ten largest Norwegian cities' share of total diesel and gasoline consumption in the model base year.
Traffic accidents with person injuries are more reasonably related to all traffic. The welfare cost of
traffic accidents is quite prosaic as measured by the model: It consists of estimated medical expenses,
material expenses and administrative expenses.
The external effects described so far cover major impacts of domestic production and consumption.
In addition we have included acidification of forests and lakes.
2.7 Baseline input
We simulate the model on baseline input aggregated from input compiled by the Ministry of
Finance for the last long term projection of the Norwegian economy. The projection ends in 2030.
From then on, we assume exogenous values consistent with a steady state.
The Ministry of Finance projects moderate growth with average annual GDP growth to 2030 about
1.7 percent. This has to do with a foreseen zero growth in the labour force and a reduction in the
growth contribution from the petroleum and hydro-power industries, which are limited in the long run
by natural resource scarcities. We treat these scarcities as different from an environmental drag, since
energy can be imported at a given price.
In the steady state long run, growth converges to 2 percent annually, which is the rate of
exogenous labour saving technical change. It takes the economy of the traditional model around 35
years to reach an approximate steady state. It takes longer for the economy of the feedback model. For
more detail on the baseline input, see Olsen and Vennemo (1994).
3 Main results
3.1 An outline
To outline the impacts of the environment on the productive economy, consider table 2. It shows the
production structure of a simple general equilibrium model on a log-differentiated form, and is
designed to give information on the difference between the traditional model in a given year and the
feedback model in the same year. We may think of the feedback model as a perturbed version of the
traditional model.
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Variables (log differentiated).
h: productivity index
1:	 labour supply
n: labour supply in efficiency units
plc: user cost of capital
pi: costs of labour in efficiency units
w: wage rate
y: output
Parameters:
E:	 labour supply elasticity
T: change in output coefficient of labour
Øk: cost share of capital
01: cost share of labour
w= pi +h	 (2)
1= cw	 (3)
n= h+1	 (4)
y= n+11	 (5)
Ø k
131= -
1
 Pk0
(1)
Table 2. Log-differential small model
Equation (1) says that any increase in the user cost of capital will transmit into a lower wage rate. The
reason is the small open economy assumption. Overall unit costs are therefore fixed, and labour costs
must be flexible in order to accommodate that. How strongly wages respond to an increase in the user
cost of capital depends on the cost shares of labour and capital.
The primary reason for an increase in the user cost of capital in the feedback model is that
corrosion increases depreciation rates. More maintenance and repair makes capital more expensive to
use. A secondary reason is that the economy that is influenced by the environment is on a different
dynamic path with a different set of asset prices, affecting the investment good price and its rate of
change.
Equation (2) shows the change in the hourly wage 'rate to be the change in the labour cost of
producers derived from equation (1), plus the change in productivity or "efficiency". The price
producers pay for labour, which is the focus of equation (1), is denoted in efficiency units. Consumers
are however interested in the hourly wage. To find the change in that variable, we must add the
change in efficiency to the change in pay per unit of efficiency.
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The change in efficiency is the other channel of influence from the environment to the productive
economy. The environment imposes a decrease in efficiency, which reinforces the decrease in the
wage.
Equation (3) shows the change in labour supply to be the change in the wage times the labour
supply elasticity. Since the wage falls, labour supply will fall as well. For simplicity we ignore the
wealth effect on labour supply in this equation. The wealth effect, which of course is present in the
full dynamic model, modifies the fall in the labour supply: with environmental drags we must expect
the households of the economy to be poorer than if there were no drags. This lower wealth calls for
reduced consumption of leisure, and a higher labour supply cet.par. We conjecture, however, that the
effect of reduced wages is the stronger.
Equation (4) shows the change in labour supply measured in efficiency units. This variable is
determined by the change in labour supply measured in natural units from equation (3), plus the
change in efficiency or productivity per natural unit. The fall in labour supply measured in efficiency
units will be larger than the fall measured in natural units, as efficiency goes down.
Equation (5) shows the change in GDP. Like in other growth models, the limiting factor on GDP
growth in this model is the availability of labour in efficiency units. The fall in GDP will equal the fall
in labour supply measured in efficiency units plus the change in the output coefficient of labour. Since
the user cost of capital increases and the producer price of labour falls, we should expect the output
coefficient of labour to fall (more labour per unit of output). The fall in the output coefficient of
labour will contribute to the fall in GDP. The response of the output coefficient of labour to given
price changes depends on the substitution possibilities in production.
From the fall in GDP follows a fall in consumption. The time path of consumption is however
different from that of production, as the current account is endogenous at any point in time. Using the
current account as a buffer, households are able to smooth the effect of environmental drags.
We now tum to the quantification of the effects that we have mentioned. We discuss emissions and
fuel consumption first to indicate implications from the economy to the environment. We then discuss
the impact on depreciation, productivity, wages and labour supply. Thereafter we turn to GDP and
some other macroeconomic impacts. Finally we discuss welfare issues. The simulations are run for
101 years from 1989 to 2090. By 2090 the economy is approximated by a steady state path that
continues into infinity. We will mainly treat the period from base year 1989 until 2030, but will also
comment on some interesting steady state results.
3.2 Emissions and fuel consumption
The activity level increases over time in both the feedback and the traditional model. Figure 2 shows a
101 year time path for the pollutants that cause feedbacks in the model: 502, NON, CO and
particulates. The increased activity level doubles gasoline and diesel consumption from 1989 to 2030
as the demand for transportation increases with income. Consumption of heating oil also doubles in
this period.
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We see that emissions grow fast the very first years, and are then reduced towards 2010, to
increase in the long run. Although all emissions more or less are tied to the same emission carriers,
figure 2 shows that they grow at very different speeds in the first years. CO and particulates fall, or
grow very slow. SO2 and NO grow between 30 and 80 percent until 2030. All pollutants grow less
than fossil fuel consumption. The differences are smaller in a 100-year perspective. Pollution growth
is lower than fossil fuel growth because of
abatement measures and because pollution
from some specific sources diminishes over
, SO 2 	 time. Abatement of transportation fuels will
4 	 reduce the growth in NO
 and CO emissions.
NO Abatement in industries and cleaner, less
3  	 sulphur-intensive fuel-oils will reduce the
CO	 growth in SO2 emissions. Some pollutants
2  	 have particular explanatory variables. A large
./f)articulate	 share of emissions of particulates and CO is
-	
matter
_	
tied to exogenous use of fire-wood stoves.
This use is projected to be constant over
	1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090	 time.
The reason for the long run exponential
path is that in the steady state, all emission carriers approach a growth rate equal to the 2 percent rate
of technical progress. Emissions will also grow by this rate unless there is steady state increases in
abatement.
3.3 Depreciation, productivity and wages
Table 3 shows the difference in depreciation, user cost of capital, price of effective labour,
productivity and wages in feedback model compared with traditional model for the years 2030 and
2090.
Table 3. Percentage difference between the feedback model and the traditional model in the years
2030 and 2090
Figure 2. Time path of 502, NO,, CO and
particulates, 1989 = 1.00.
13
2030	 2090
Depreciation of buildings in tradables industry	 0.15	 1.54
Depreciation of roads	 55.80	 58.04
User cost of capital in tradables industry	 0.02	 0.21
Price of effective labour	 -0.01	 -0.13
Productivity	 -0.76	 -5.20
Wage	 -0.77	 -5.32
Corrosion is estimated to increase the depreciation rate of buildings (in the feedback model compared
with the traditional model) by 0.15 percent until 2030. This is an empirically moderate figure.
Depreciation of public capital (roads) increases 56 percent to 2030, from a low base-value.
The increase in the depreciation of private capital, i.e. buildings and structures influence wages
through the requirement that price equals cost, c.f. equation (1) above. Depreciation of public capital
increases public consumption, which crowds out private consumption.
The increase in the private user cost of capital in the competitive industry is 0.02 percent by 2030.
This figure is lower than the change in depreciation of buildings and structures because depreciation is
only one aspect of the user cost of capital.
The increase in the cost of capital depresses the producer price of effective labour by 0.01 percent
in order to keep overall costs constant. That is less than the increase in the cost of capital because the
cost share of labour is larger than that of capital. Intuitively, the fall in the wage can be spread thinner
than the corresponding increase in the user cost of capital.
To arrive at the change in wages we need an impact of efficiency, c.f. equation (2) above.
Figure 3 shows the time path of the difference in labour productivity between models over 101 years.
In 2030, the difference is 0.8 percent, but
Figure 3. Percentage difference in productivity	 growing exponentially. By 2090 the difference
between traditional model and 'feedback model. 	 in productivity is 5.2 percent. The reason for
1989-2090.
	 the exponential growth is that emissions,
gasoline, diesel consumption and traffic all
grow exponentially in the steady state. For
-1 linear relation between productivity and its
-2  	 environmental determinants, which also grow
-3  	 exponentially, over the next century. The
-4  	 imposed maximum productivity loss is not
binding, nor is the second order term in the
-5
polynomial relation between productivity and
6- i	 i	 i	 i	 i	 i	 ,	 L.
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 its determinants important. Depreciation
shows a similar pattern.
practical purposes it seems that there is a
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3.4 Labour and capital
Table 4 indicates the impact of the environmental drags on labour and capital input. In the year 2030
labour supply is 0.3 percent lower in the feedback scenario, c.f. equation (3). By 2090 it is 3.1
percent lower. The world with environmental drags is one where we work less than we would have
done otherwise.
1989-2030	 1989-2090
Labour supply	 -0.3	 -3.1
Effective labour input 	 -1.2	 -9.2
Capital input 	 -1.3
	
-8.0
Investment
	 -0.2	 -12.0
Table 4. Environmental drags on labour and capital input. Percentage difference between feedback
model and traditional model
When measured in effective units, c.f. equation (4), which is what matters for production, labour input
is 1.2 percent lower in year 2030.
Capital input falls 1.3 percent by 2030. This is a combination of two effects: One is a substitution
effect away from more expensive capital into cheaper labour: the fact that capital gets more expensive
to maintain and repair encourages firms to hire more labour and reduce their demand for capital. The
substitution effect occurs per unit of output. The other, and quantitatively more important effect is that
the scale of production goes down, which decreases the demand for real capital at given prices. The
reason the scale of production goes down is that labour input goes down in macro.
Gross investments are affected in two ways as well: first by the need to replace, maintain and
repair a greater share of capital as corrosion sets in, and second by the economy's response to
environmental feedbacks in the form of lower demand for capital. Most of the period before 2030
gross investment increases as the replacement effect is the most important. Later on, gross investment
decreases heavily because of the general equilibrium response.
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Figure 4. Time paths for GDP and consumption.
Percentage difference traditional model and
feedback model.
2
0
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3.5 GDP and consumption
The fall in labour supply and capital
contribute to a lower activity level in the
feedback scenario, c.f. equation (5). GDP
of 2030 is 0.82 percent lower. The GDP
gap grows over time because of the
exponential decline in productivity
compared with the traditional model. The
decline is actually stronger than
exponential, because the growth rate of
emission picks up after 2030 when there
is no extra abatement. The difference
reaches 8.8 percent by 2090, see figure 4.
There is no immediate effect on GDP.
The lower GDP level of the feedback scenario yields less income and less consumption. The 2030
value of private consumption in the model with environmental feedbacks is 1.4 percent lower than in
the traditional model. Consumers act as if they spread the fall in income over the entire period, and
consume less in each period. The immediate fall in consumption is 1.0 percent compared with the
traditional model, while the long run fall towards the end of the next century is 3.5 percent. The
reductions in GDP and consumption reduce consumption of fossil fuels, which reduces emissions.
That induces positive second order effects on the environment: The environmental costs are
dampened. 
1988-2030 1988-2090
0.092
0.036
GDP
Consumption
0.020
0.033
Table S. Environmental drags on GDP and consumption. Difference in annual growth between
traditional model and feedback model. Percent
Table 5 shows that environmental feedbacks reduce annual growth in GDP by 0.02 percent until 2030.
Since the growth of the GDP gap is increasing, the reduction in the growth rate is larger in the long
run. The consumption growth rate is reduced by 0.03 percent until 2030. This reduction is not
significantly more pronounced in the long run.
It is clear from looking at figure 4 above that the measured reduction in the consumption growth
rate would have been larger if we examined a shorter period (i.e. 1988 until 2000) since there would
have been fewer years by which to spread the reduction in the level.
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3.6 Trade balance
Consumers' long term adjustment to a lower activity level opens a gap between production and
consumption the first years, see figure 4. Consumers spend less, but produce the same. In these years
the economy runs a trade balance surplus compared to the traditional model. In the long run this trade
balance surplus increases interest income from abroad.
Larger foreign income opens for a larger long term deficit in the trade balance. It is possible for
consumers to maintain a relatively higher consumption level in the long run, since it is "paid for" in
the beginning of the period. We see how the change in the trade balance is a consequence of the
producer and consumer adjustments to environmental feedbacks.
3.7 Welfare
Recall that the arguments of our money metric welfare function are consumption of goods and
services, leisure and environmental services. We measure equivalent variation divided by initial
wealth and call the result percent welfare change. Welfare is intertemporal, i.e. it is a statistic of
consumption of goods/services, leisure and environmental services over the entire infinite time-span.
If consumption of goods and services was the only argument of the welfare function, we would
expect a welfare loss from environmental feedbacks in the region of 2-3 percent, which is the average
decrease in consumption in the feedback scenario. For instance, if consumption was 2 percent lower
each and every year, the percent welfare change would also be 2 percent if consumption was the only
argument. But part of the reason consumption and production is lower in the feedback scenario is, as
we have seen, that labour supply decreases. That is to say that people have more leisure in the
feedback world. The partial effect of this increase in leisure is higher welfare.
There is a welfare loss from consumption of goods/services and leisure taken together, which is to
be expected. The net effect of accounting for the environment in the production process is after all to
impose additional costs on the economy. It would be strange if those did not imply a net loss in
welfare. The net welfare loss from full consumption is 0.8 percent. That is to say that the welfare
effect of the environmental feedbacks into production, corrosion, road depreciation and productivity is
a 0.8 percent intertemporal loss.
To get the full picture we must however add disutility from lower environmental services. It turns
out to be significantly more important than welfare from full consumption, and amounts to 9.2 percent
of total wealth. That means that to have zero pollution, noise etc. would be equivalent for consumers
to a 9.2 percent increase in wealth. Such an increase in wealth could finance a 9.2 percent higher
annual level of full consumption. If we transform this into annual growth, otherwise known as
environmental drag, the annual growth rate required to reach a 9.2 percent higher level by 2030 is
0.22 percent.
A break-down of welfare from environmental services shows NO emissions, congestion, traffic
accidents and noise to cause the greatest harm, see table 6.
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Table 6. Percentage distribution of disutility from lower environmental services in 2030
Health damage from emissions of NO
	
35
Costs of congestion	 31
Costs of traffic accidents	 23
Disutility of noise
	 7
The cost of
 NO emissions is significantly higher than the cost of other emissions. One reason may be
that 03 (ozone) formation is not significantly high enough to limit NO concentrations. Second, NO
emissions are high to begin with, implying that a certain percentage increase in emissions equals a
high increase in concentration levels in densely populated areas.
The other main cost components are congestion and traffic accidents. Traffic related costs
contribute around one half of the total estimate (the number fluctuates over the years). By contrast,
domestic contribution to acidification of lakes and forests contribute insignificantly to the total
estimate.
The full welfare difference between the traditional and feedback worlds is 9.95 percent of welfare,
or 716 billion NOK. The annual growth rate of wealth required to reach 9.95 percent by 2030 is 0.23
percent.
Our welfare indicator is of course not meant to include everything that gives welfare to members
of the economy. The model includes a limited number of arguments, and the measurement of their
impact is a difficult and controversial matter.
Of the seven pollutants projected by the model, CO2,
 CH4 and NMVOC do not have any formal
welfare impact in the model. One might nevertheless find it significant that CO2 increases around 80
percent until 2030 in the feedback model. Emissions of CHI, another greenhouse gas, also increase. In
the steady state, all three emissions grow.
Premature deaths in traffic accidents is another variable of relevance to welfare. Accumulated
traffic deaths reduces the population of 2030 by 7700. Injuries rise from 33000 in 1989 to 67000 in
2030. These numbers hide suffering and grief of great welfare importance. Recall that our model by
contrast treats accidents and injuries as an issue of resource costs only, while a death to one of n
members of the population is simply the removal of 1/n of total utility.
4 Sensitivity
The important parameters of the model are the parameters reflecting environmental damage for the
feedback model, and the substitution parameters in production and consumption. This section explores
the sensitivity of model results with respect to these parameters. The focus is on welfare change. See
table 7.
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Alternative	 Total welfare	 Welfare from	 Welfare from
consumption	 environment
1 Base-case	 9.95	 0.76	 9.19
2 Damage parameters halved 	 5.36
	
0.77	 4.60
3 Damage parameters doubled 	 19.15
	
0.76	 18.38
4 Productivity reducing parameters halved 	 9.31
	
0.02	 9.28
5 Productivity reducing parameters doubled
	 11.20	 2.19	 9.01
6 Depreciation rates halved	 9.49	 0.36	 9.13
7 Depreciation rates doubled
	 11.25
	
1.94	 9.31
8 Inelastic labour supply	 9.89
	
0.64	 9.25
9 Elastic labour supply	 9.97
	
1.03	 8.94
10 Inelastic substitution in production	 10.11	 0.78	 9.33
11 Elastic substitution in production	 9.85
	 0.75	 9.10
Table 7. Welfare loss under different parameter assumptions. 2030. Percent
Alternative 1 is the "base-case" discussed in section 3.
4.1 Environmental feedbacks
4.1.1 Marginal disutilities
In alternatives 2 and 3 the marginal disutilities of emissions and traffic accidents are reduced by 50
percent and doubled respectively. Since consumer demand and producer behaviour are unaffected by
the strength of welfare from environmental services, variations in these parameters only affect the
environmentally generated utility loss.
To double the monetary value of environmental quality implies that disutility from a polluted
environment doubles, and the estimated welfare loss almost doubles. The underlying point is that
welfare from the environment is homogenous of degree one in the value coefficients2.
2 Brendemoen, Glomsrod and Aasenid (1992) ascribe a larger confidence interval than 1:4 (one half versus double) to
most of their value coefficients. On the other hand, if the value coefficients vary independently, which seems a reasonable
prior, one will expect some to be larger than their expected values, and some to be smaller. The full multivariate distribution
will then tend to be more collected than an examination of each parameter would suggest. This point is pursued in
Brendemoen and Vennemo (1993).
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4.1.2 Labour productivity
In alternatives 4 and 5 a similar exercise is carried out for the parameters that describe the impact on
labour productivity. Recall table 2. When productivity lowering coefficients are doubled, we expect
output and consumption to decline: wages fall because workers are rewarded according to their
provision of labour efficiency units (equation 2). Labour supply therefore falls, and effective labour
supply falls even more. Substitution of leisure for work dampens the welfare loss, and it is fair to say
that the impact of doubling the productivity lowering coefficients is not dramatic. Disutility from
environmental services is also somewhat reduced, which dampens the welfare loss further, but the
feedback via environmental welfare is all in all relatively unaffected.
4.1.3 Depreciation
The next scenarios (6,7) illustrate the impact of assumptions about environmentally induced rates of
depreciation. We return to table 2: Higher depreciation rates increase the user cost of capital (equation
1), which lowers wages, labour supply, output and consumption. Consumption of leisure increases,
but the overall effect on utility from full consumption is to increase the loss in welfare. The
explanation is that a steeper increase in depreciation rates imposes an additional cost on the economy.
Disutility from environmental services actually increases when depreciation rates go up. That is
somewhat surprising given that the economy contracts as explained above. One would expect fossil
fuel use and with that environmental problems to contract as well.
What this argument overlooks is substitution possibilities in production. It is true that household
consumption of fossil fuels goes down (because their consumption expenditure goes down), but on the
production side, higher capital prices lead to substitution away from capital and into for example
energy. The economy switches to a more energy-intensive mode which in equilibrium increases
consumption of fossil fuels and the environmental problems that go with it. It is fair to say however,
that the increase in disutility from environmental services is quite small.
We offer the following conclusion from this section of the sensitivity analysis: Our results are quite
robust to the parameters affecting the production side of the economy, that is the parameters of
productivity loss and the parameters of depreciation. Thus the welfare loss from consumption is robust
to alternative specifications. The results are not equally robust to a proportional change in all
parameters describing disutility from the environment.
4.2 Substitution parameters
4.2.1 Labour supply elasticity
The reaction of labour supply to wage changes is focused in alternatives 8 and 9. From table 2
(equation 3) we recall that a small labour supply elasticity (inelastic supply) transforms a given wage
rate change into a relatively small change in labour supply, while a large labour supply elasticity
(elastic supply) does the opposite. The outcome in the inelastic case is a smaller loss in consumption
of goods and services and a smaller loss in traditional welfare.
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There is a danger here of explaining the smaller loss in traditional welfare only in terms of the
smaller loss in consumption of goods and services. In that case, the smaller loss in traditional welfare
would be self evident. But the story is more complicated. In the inelastic alternative, the smaller loss
in consumption (which contributes to a smaller welfare loss) is accompanied by a smaller increase in
leisure consumption (which contributes to a larger welfare loss). The reason for the overall smaller
loss is taxation.
From the consumer's partial point of view, the utility effect of exchanging one unit of
consumption for one unit of leisure is zero as the price ratio she faces equals her marginal rate of
substitution. But because of taxation the value to society of her working exceeds the value she puts on
it herself. The marginal productivity of labour exceeds the net real wage rate. Some of the rewards
from working goes to society as taxes. From society's point of view therefore, her working one hour
extra more than pays for itself since it produces the amount of consumption goods she demands in
order to work one hour extra, plus it leaves something to pick up since the marginal productivity is
higher than the wage. This "profit" is handed back to the consumer (formally in the form of lump sum
tax refunds) and constitutes the source of the smaller loss.
While implying a smaller loss in traditional welfare, an inelastic labour supply on the other hand
increases the disutility from environmental services. That is because it is labour supply that limits
production. Inelastic labour supply implies a smaller reduction in labour supply and the scale of
production, and induces a relatively higher burden on the environment. Hardly anything happens to
production intensities, since factor prices (to the first order) are unaffected by the labour supply
elasticity. (There are second order effects from depreciation and productivity.) The case can be
contrasted with scenarios 6 and 7 above where the scale effect on the environment was dominated by
the effect of changing factor intensities. We see that the outcome is as ordinary intuition would
suggest with only the scale effect at work.
With inelastic labour supply, the improvement in traditional welfare (i.e. the decrease in the loss) is
larger than the deterioration in environmental welfare. We understand from the above that this has as
much to do with the tax wedge on labour as with the valuation of environmental services.
4.2.2 Production elasticities
When we view changes in the elasticities of substitution in production (alternatives 10 and 11), the
story is similar to that of labour supply. Larger elasticities of substitution induce producers to change
more of one factor for another, but the extra profit from that is zero at going producer prices.
Consumer welfare is affected to the extent that producer prices of factors and output are different from
the "shadow" prices that properly reflect marginal trade off in the economy.
For instance, higher elasticities of substitution will induce producers to use more labour (the
cheaper input) and less capital (the more expensive input). This has two effects on welfare: Production
falls since the output coefficient of labour goes down. Investment demand on the other hand goes
down as well, which at constant production leaves more room for consumption and welfare. If
producers had faced shadow prices, these two effects would cancel. The resources saved on
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investment and capital would equal the reduction in output. An inspection of alternatives 10 and 11
shows that this is approximately what happens. Traditional welfare is relatively unaffected by the
elasticities of substitution.
Fuel demand is relatively lower in the elastic case. The primary reason is that producers shift out of
e.g., fuel into (cheaper) labour in this case. They also shift from (more expensive) capital into e.g.,
fuel, but the former effect is empirically stronger. That is why we see somewhat lower disutility from
the environment in this scenario.
The conclusion we draw from examining the effects of changing labour supply and elasticities of
production is the following: neither of these parameters seem to have significant effects on the
outcome. Our results are quite robust to changes in their values.
5 Exploratory sources of drag
This section investigates some sources of environmental drag that some (especially environmentalists)
would claim were important, while others would claim that they were not important, or (in some
cases) had nothing to do with the environment as such. The sources are: Whether conventional
economic analysis uses a too high discount rate, whether the assumed rate of technical progress is too
high, and whether energy prices will increase more than projected at the moment. It is interesting to
check their implications for the results. Table 8 summarises the results.
Table 8. Welfare loss given exploratory sources of drags. 2030. Percent
Alternative	 Total welfare	 Welfare from	 Welfare from
consumption	 environment
1 Base-case	 9.95	 0.76	 9.19
12 Rate of time preference 0 pct.	 11.33	 1.46	 9.87
13 Rate of time preference 3 pct.	 8.77	 0.26	 8.52
14 Planner's rate of time preference 0 pct.	 13.93	 0.70	 13.23
15 Planner's rate of time preference 3 pct.	 6.65	 0.86	 5.79
16 Technical progress 3 pct.	 9.75	 0.57	 9.19
17 Technical progress 1 pct.	 9.79	 0.76	 9.03
18 Techn. progr. 1 pct. in feedback model	 37.10
	 30.80	 6.30
19 Low fossil fuel price
	 10.16	 0.79	 9.38
20 High fossil fuel price	 9•49	 0•70	 8.79
21 High fossil fuel price in feedback model 	 6.32	 -2.78	 9.10
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5.1 A lower discount rate?
Environmentalists sometimes claim that the discount rate is, or should be lower than assumed in
traditional economic analysis. The idea is that when all plans, investment decisions etc. take a lower
discount rate as a premise, the environmental drag will decrease because what happens far into the
future carries more weight. A too high discount rate therefore accentuates environmental drags. We
take up this issue in two ways.
First, we investigate the consequence of decreasing (and increasing) the subjective rate of time
preference in the model (alternatives 12 and 13). This has as one of its consequences to decrease
(increase) the discount rate. (The discount rate is of course higher than the rate of time preference
because consumption increases over time.) The base-case subjective rate of time preference is 1
percent. We explore the consequences of 0 and 3 percent instead.
Our analysis finds that contrary to popular opinion, the environmental drag increases with a low
discount rate. The reasoning behind our result is the following:
A lower discount rate has no particular effect on how an environmental feedback of a given size
affects prices, labour supply or GDP, i.e. the variables of table 2. It is true that a lower discount rate
reduces the user cost of capital, but that happens both in the traditional model and in the feedback
model.
The main impact of a lower discount rate is to change the consumer's trade-off between
consumption now and in the future. That too is the case for both scenarios, but it has a greater impact
in the feedback scenario: Recall that the consumer of the feedback scenario hedged against the future
impact of production drags by saving some of his early income. The reward to this action is reduced
by a lower discount rate, because interest rates fall as the lower discounting penetrates the market. A
lower interest rate means that consumers must save more early on in order to enjoy the same steady
state consumption level later on. This constitutes a welfare loss (traditional welfare) for them. To put
it differently, a lower discount rate strains the current account and the original consumption path
cannot be sustained. This bites more in the feedback scenario.
Consumers partly respond to the strain on the current account by working more, which increases
production and modifies the fall in intertemporal consumption. The increase in production however
harms the environment, and disutility from lower environmental services rises. (There is an opposite
effect on the environment: A lower interest rate reduces the user cost of capital, which leads to more
capital intensive, and less energy intensive production. The scale effect on production is obviously
larger.)
To summarise: A lower discount rate does not induce producers to prevent long-term
environmental effects of their actions, which would be too much to ask for anyway given that the
effects are external. A lower discount rate strains the current account, pushes the intertemporal trade
frontier inwards (for savers), increases production and reduces consumption of goods/services, leisure
and environmental services.
The next argument regarding the discount rate that we take up is the following: When society
evaluates the result of an economic process, it may be desirable or reasonable to employ a lower
discount rate than the members of society do as economic agents. To put it differently, the market rate
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is distorted for some reason. One reason that has been advanced is that individual agents do not care
enough for their descendants. Another says that one should employ a lower interest rate in the lack of
first best instrument to combat environmental problems. The idea that one should not discount utility
in welfare evaluations goes back a long way, see e.g., Ramsey (1928).
Alternatives 14 and 15 look at the impact of evaluating the economic outcome by means of a O or 3
percent rate of time preference, respectively (the base case is 1 percent). The impact on welfare from
full consumption is small because of consumption smoothing. Consumption smoothing implies that
the largest losses in full consumption do not necessarily come last. The largest impact is on welfare
from the environment. A low planner's rate of time preference puts more emphasis on damages far
into the future, and these damages are the largest (in current value) since pollution is the largest far
into the future. Disutility from lower environmental quality increases 45 percent (4 percentage points).
By contrast, a high planners' rate of time preference discounts high future damages more, reducing the
impact on intertemporal utility. Disutility from lower environmental quality decreases 37 percent.
5.2 Lower technological progress?
Environmentalists sometimes accuse the standard economic analysis of assuming too high future
technological progress. Alternatives 16 and 17 evaluate how technological progress affects welfare
losses. Reducing technical progress is similar to reducing the rate of discount, but in addition it has
scale effects on production and consumption. Reducing the rate of technical progress will reduce the
steady state interest rate, since the interest rate from the Euler-equation is linked to steady state
consumption growth. This contributes to a higher loss in welfare from consumption, similarly to the
higher loss of a low rate of time preference.
A low rate of technical progress over time implies a smaller scale of production. A smaller scale of
production implies lower pollution and smaller environmental feedbacks. This contributes to a lower
loss in welfare from consumption. All in all reducing the rate of technical progress has two opposing
effects on welfare from consumption: the interest rate effect increases the loss, and the scale effect
decreases it. The strengths of these effects are non-symmetric around the base-case.
In terms of welfare from the environment, reduced technical progress implies lower growth in
emissions, and lower disutility from reduced environmental services. The effect on intertemporal
disutility from reduced environmental services is modified by the increased work effort that is part of
the answer to lower interest rates.
Alternative 18 takes a different approach to technological progress. It shows the effects of
assuming lower technological progress in the feedback scenario only. One possible explanation for
confining lower technological progress to this scenario is that economic development over time
reduces the biodiversity that is the source of some technological progress like new inventions in
medicine. This argument is less compelling in a national model of Norway. But there may also be
other reasons why technical progress should be lower in the feedback scenario, and in any case it is of
interest to review the effects of changing this parameter. For illustration we have made the difference
one of 1 versus 2 percent.
24
The outcome of a low rate is an overwhelming increase in the welfare loss from full consumption,
as could be expected. Lower technical progress makes the economy a lot worse off in terms of income
opportunities. In particular there is a striking difference from changing the productivity level
(scenarios 2 and 3). The conclusion is that feedbacks on technical progress will create large
environmental drags.
While loosing more traditional welfare, the quality of the environment improves. The reason is,
again, that lower technical progress expands the economy more slowly, leading to lower emissions.
5.3 Increasing energy prices?
Environmentalists sometimes claim that energy prices in the long run will increase more than assumed
by the standard analysis. The baseline input assumes a 14 percent growth in real fossil fuel prices by
2030, which amounts to a 0.32 percent annual growth. What is the impact on the environmental drag
of assuming higher (and lower, for comparison) fossil fuel prices? That is the topic of alternatives 19,
20 and 21. By "higher" we mean 2.5 percent annual growth. "Lower" means zero growth.
Higher prices of fossil fuels imply that producers move away from energy as an input to
production into a more energy efficient mode of production. Emissions per unit of output fall. In
addition the level of output falls because lower labour supply means a contraction of the economy. All
in all emissions fall, which reduces the disutility from pollution.
Alternative 21 assume that prices in the model without environmental feedbacks increase
according to the baseline input, while only the prices in the feedback model rise more. This scenario
confirms Norway's benefits from higher energy prices. The effect on welfare from consumption is
positive. A more energy efficient technology contributes' to a better environment, while higher
consumption works in the opposite direction. The total effect is a slight improvement in welfare from
environment.
A conclusion to the analysis of exploratory sources of environmental drags is the following: The
results are robust with respect to a lower market rate of time preference. The effect of a lower
planner's rate of time preference is significant, but not dramatic. The results are robust to energy
prices and technical progress as long as both the traditional and feedback scenarios are affected.
Assuming lower technical progress in the feedback model only creates a big impact. Some of the
effects that we do detect run against popular wisdom. For instance, endowing agents with a lower rate
of time preference will increase the impact of environmental drags.
6 Conclusions
We started this paper by asking the question of whether the economy can -- or should -- grow in the
long run in the face of ecological constraints. Our analysis indicates that the answer to the "can" part
is affirmative so far, on the background of the limited number of feedback mechanisms included in
this study. Integrating the environment into the analysis does not imply that production cannot
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increase. On the contrary, the impact of economic constraints on production is probably quite modest
over most of the next century. The impact on welfare from consumption of goods/services and leisure
is even less. This conclusion is robust to a number of alternative specifications of parameters and
exogenous variables. In fact, the welfare cost of consumption shows a rather remarkable stability
across different assumption.
The answer to the "should" part is also affirmative, but maybe to a smaller degree. The welfare
cost of ignoring the environment is significant. This conclusion is also robust to a number of
alternative specifications of parameters, with the notable (and obvious) exception of the parameters
that attribute welfare to environmental services. In particular, a lower valuation of environmental
services might render the welfare cost of lower environmental quality insignificant.
These are the main conclusions of this study. It indicates that the environmental drag on production
will reduce economic growth rates by less than a tenth of a percentage point. Growth in wealth,
including environmental wealth, is reduced by 0.23 percent, which, although also a small number, is
11 times larger than the effect of production growth over the same time period.
Our results can be used as indicators of the benefits of abatement and related activities. If all the
specified sources of environmental problems were eliminated by the year 2030, the GDP of that year
would be 11 billion NOK higher (ignoring intertemporal reallocations). If all environmental problems
were eliminated today, the total intertemporal welfare gain would amount to 716 billion NOK. As we
have seen, these are small sums in percentage terms,
 but they are pretty large sums in the context of
abatement. Full abatement or elimination of all environmental problems will obviously not be cost
effective, but a large number of abatement measures could probably pass the cost-benefit test.
As always, the results of this paper are subject to a number of qualifications. For one thing, global
environmental linkages like the greenhouse effect are absent from the study, since these will affect
both the traditional and feedback scenarios equally much. They cannot be internalised by the
Norwegian economy. It may be that global environmental linkages are more important than the local
linkages that we focus on.
Regarding the effects we find on production growth, there may be interactions between the
environment and the economy that we have not accounted for. We have shown in section 5.2 that
anything that reduces the rate of technical progress will have a lasting effect on production growth,
and a large effect on welfare. An environmental linkage to that effect (for instance reduce bio-
diversity) would therefore overturn our results on production growth.
Our assumption that the unit value of environmental damage is constant is certainly doubtful. It
may in reality change with the level of damage as well as with income or just with time. Even if
interpreted as an average value, we know that the estimation of non-market environmental goods is
riddled by all sorts of theoretical and practical difficulties.
Overall, our estimate of the environmental drag is uncertain and based on a number of underlying
assumptions that some readers may find unconvincing. But that might be constructive. One of the
advantages of an applied general equilibrium analysis like ours is that the underlying assumptions are
brought into the open for discussion. Future research will no doubt improve our understanding of the
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relation between economy and ecology, and thereby refine and improve the estimates of the
environmental drag.
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